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Peace-Keeping and Security Sector
Reform (SSR)?

Lessons from South-East Asia: The case
of Timor-Leste

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Background – Human Security

- ◆ A shift from narrow bipolar ‘Cold War’ conceptions to a broader security view. **From State to Human Security (UNDP 1994)**
- ◆ Human Security (HS) as a **challenge** to the traditional notion of **national security** stating that the main referent for security should be the **individual rather than the state**

Background – Human Security

- ◆ “Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such **chronic threats** as **hunger, disease and repression**. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful **disruptions in the patterns of daily life** – whether in **homes, in jobs or in communities**. Such threats can exist at **all levels of national income and development** (UNDP 1994)
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Basic arguments for SSR

- ◆ A **people-centered** (HS), but **not state-centered**, view of security appears to be necessary for national, regional, and **global stability** (UNDP 1994)
- ◆ ‘**Vicious Circle**’: Poverty, Fragility and Conflict (Collier 2008, World Bank 2009)
- ◆ In “**Bottom Billion**” countries security forces can be a threat to development. **Military are part of the problem** (Collier 2008) Violent conflicts and illegitimate security actors perpetuate underdevelopment
- ◆ Conflict poses a threat to **spill to neighbor countries** across border (terrorism, trafficking, warlords, organized crime, etc.)

Basic Arguments for SSR

- ◆ Better for institutions to become **engaged in preventing fragility** instead of dealing with conflict
- ◆ Security Sector policies integrate into the International Development agenda under the label of **Security Sector Reform (SSR)**
- ◆ **International Donors engage with security** (UK DFID, OECD first, then UN and bilateral donors)
- ◆ SSR in different contexts: transitional, developing, post-conflict, ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states. Multinational Interventions and Peace-keeping operations served to spread **SSR worldwide**

UN approach to SSR

- ◆ UN Secretary General report “Securing peace and development: the role of the UN in supporting security sector reform” (Jan 2008)
- ◆ UN’s main task is to support national actors in achieving their security, peace and development goals. To that end, the development of **effective and accountable security institutions** on the basis of **non-discrimination**, full respect for **human rights** and the **rule of law** is essential (UN 2008: 1)

UN approach to SSR

- ◆ Security sector reform describes a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation **led by national authorities** that has as its goal the enhancement of **effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples** without discrimination and with full respect for **human rights and the rule of law** (UN 2008: para 17)
- ◆ Security Sector Reform underscores that **effectiveness; accountability and democratic governance are mutually reinforcing elements of security**. Thus, security sector reform offers a framework to assist national actors, the United Nations and other international partners in implementing a **shared vision of security**. (UN 2008: para 18)

UN 10 basic principles for SSR

- ◆ The goal of the UN in SSR is to support states in developing effective, **inclusive and accountable security institutions**;
- ◆ SSR should be **national decision based**;
- ◆ Success depends on **national ownership and commitment**;
- ◆ UN's approach must be "**flexible and tailored to the country**";
- ◆ The whole process must be **gender sensitive**;
- ◆ An **SSR framework** is essential **from the very early post-conflict recovery stages**;
- ◆ A **defined strategy** with priorities, partnerships and timelines is required;
- ◆ **International support's effectiveness** depends on the level of **accountability and resources** that are provided;
- ◆ **Coordination among national and international** actors is vital;
- ◆ **Regular evaluation and monitoring** is needed to assess SSR progress.

The Security Sector Actors

- ◆ Core security Institutions: armed forces, police, paramilitary, coast guard, militias, intelligence services.
 - ◆ Sec. Sector Oversight Bodies: legislatures –its committees-, ministries of Defense and Interior, etc.
 - ◆ Non-core security Institutions: judiciary, customs, correctional services, etc.
 - ◆ Non-state security institutions: liberation / guerilla armies, private security companies, party militias.
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(Ball and Brzoska 2002: 8)

SSR in Practice

- ◆ SSR is a policy related concept coming from Donors, International Organizations, Academia, Private Consultancy, Local Governments, PSMC, NGOs, etc.
- ◆ SSR deals in practice with a broad variety of issues: from DDR, SALW, and demining, to criminal and transitional justice, strengthening human rights and the rule of law, fighting trafficking (humans, weapons and drugs) until good practices, civilian oversight and accountability for the security sector.

SSR in the World

- ◆ Post-conflict and violent scenarios: Afghanistan, Mozambique, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Kosovo and Balkan States, **Timor-Leste**, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Colombia, Haiti.
- ◆ So-called 'Failed' States: Somalia, Liberia
- ◆ Transitional democracies: Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries: Bulgaria, Rumania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan.

Background – Timor-Leste



Source: worldatlas.com

Background – Timor-Leste

- ◆ Portuguese colonial rule – 16th to 20th century
- ◆ Japanese occupation (during WWII)
- ◆ Indonesian annexation (1975-1999)
- ◆ UN-sponsored Popular Consultation in 1999 put an end to the Indonesian rule
- ◆ Humanitarian intervention was launched by the United Nations Security Council after Pro-Indonesia Militias massacres
- ◆ UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) governed the territory for almost three years (1999-2002)
- ◆ UN sponsored 2002 Independence (1st Independence in 1975?)

Background – Timor-Leste

- ◆ Size: almost 15,000 square kilometers - 5,640 square miles (half the size of Burundi)
- ◆ Population: around 1 million
- ◆ Capital city: Dili (13 districts in the whole country)
- ◆ Languages: Tetum and Portuguese (official languages) Bahasa Indonesia (widely spoken) and English (after UN period)
- ◆ Religion: the second Roman Catholic country in Asia
- ◆ GPD per capita: 550 (2004), listed by UNTAD as one of the Least Developed Countries (LCD - 2005) as Mozambique, Angola, Malawi and Zambia (also Burundi and Tanzania)
- ◆ Main export: Coffee (historically) and Oil (more recently)
- ◆ Currency: US Dollar
- ◆ The newest country in the 21st century
- ◆ Literacy: 48% (around half a million people)
- ◆ Life expectancy: low - 49 years

Based on information from the following web sites: cia.gov, bbc.co.uk, dfat.gov.au, ausaid.gov.au, timor-leste.gov.tl, and state.gov, accessed on March 2011

Peacekeeping and SSR?

- ◆ Timor-Leste offered a post-conflict scenario where the UN tried out a new policy approach that was intended **to secure peace and development by linking Security with Development**: ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR)
- ◆ Under UNTAET’s mission (1999-2002) one of the greatest challenges was the development of an indigenous Security Sector
- ◆ However, the instability and the clashes between the security forces created by UNTAET and the 2006 crisis proved that the experiment was unsuccessful

Peacekeeping and SSR?

- ◆ The UN operation in Timor-Leste was presented as successful model for future peace-keeping and state-building operations
- ◆ In 1999, the UNSC (Resolution 1272/1999) launched a Transitional Administration (UNTAET) with a Peacekeeping mandate
- ◆ Fully assuming Timor-Leste's sovereignty and power
- ◆ Operated in practice as a state-building experiment
- ◆ SSR was part of the experiment (but out of its mandate)

SSR in Timor-Leste

- ◆ An analysis of SSR process in the light of the core of UNSG 2008

Security Sector Reform principles:

1. DDR
 2. Planning, Strategy and Implementation
 3. Local Ownership
 4. Tailored to the Needs of the Country
 5. Rule of Law and Civilian Oversight
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DDR in Timor-Leste

- ◆ No explicit mandate for UNTAET to do DDR – not a primary actor
 - ◆ The plan came from the King's College (UK) in 2000 (a year late)
 - ◆ Bilateral actors (Office for Defense Force Development – ODFD) and World Bank, IOM, USAid and Japanese Government (Falintil Reinsertion Assistance Project - FRAP). Only 1,000 beneficiaries and for a year
 - ◆ Around half of Falintil veterans were entitled to integrate the Defense Force
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DDR in Timor-Leste

- ◆ Original idea of a strong Gendarmerie, not an Army and a Police
- ◆ A year waiting in poor conditions. Falintil in state of revolt (Gusmao)
- ◆ Timorese people and leaders felt robbed, seeing how their heroes were mistreated, Falintil partially dismantled, and the process out of their control
- ◆ Demobilized fighters became actor of violence and instability pursuing their own political objectives (paramilitary groups, organized gangs and ex-combatants organizations)

Planning, Strategy and Implementation

- ◆ SSR should begin at the outset of a peace process. In Timor-Leste case it appeared to be Peacekeeping Mission exit strategy. King's College Plan
- ◆ High expectations. 2,800 police officers by the end of UNTAET
- ◆ Absence of trainers among CIVPOL official (double task - policing and training). Until mid-2000
- ◆ Not all CIVPOL are the same. Different system, police quality, human rights issues. Violent Trainers create violent police?
- ◆ Insufficient training for Police officers. A short 3 month theory and 6 months field course

Planning, Strategy and Implementation

- ◆ Western Procedures for selecting candidates
- ◆ The language issue. Not many were capable of speaking in English
- ◆ Nationality of the UN SSR and CIVPOL advisers mattered
- ◆ Absence of a single SSR model. Each one trying to ‘impose’ his own national manual

Local Ownership and SSR

- ◆ Lack of fluent interaction between UNTAET and local leadership. CNRT and Xanana Gusmao only
- ◆ UNTAET failed to include Timorese leader in SSR
- ◆ PORLI issue. Inclusion of former Indonesian Policemen (POLRI) in high positions in the new police force diminished legitimacy and credibility (a shortcut because they had ‘experience’ and could speak some English?)
- ◆ The Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) was a part of CIVPOL almost until the end of the mission
- ◆ DDR and Defense Force Formation: World Bank and Donors decision + King’s College Plan

Local Ownership and SSR

- ◆ POLRI were part of the defeated power (Indonesia). Because of the inclusion of former POLRI in PNTL, the people saw the new police as a threat (Alkatiri – First Prime Minister)
- ◆ When asked what posed the greatest threat to Timor Leste's security in 2004, a senior officer in the High Command of the country's defence force, the FALINTIL-FDTL, and a 24 year veteran of the guerrilla resistance to Indonesian occupation, stated simply, 'The police' (Rees 2006: 6)

Tailored to the Needs of the Country

- ◆ Fragmentation of the Police into a variety of specific divisions (due to multilateral and bilateral advising during UNTAET)
- ◆ Police was highly armed (some divisions better than the army). Intra-force rivalry
- ◆ Financial Constraints. King's College Plan was too expensive. Around 12% of the budget in defense in the early stage of recovery
- ◆ High expenditure in defense slows the development pace
- ◆ Expensive Defense Force and under-funded Police
- ◆ Psychological aspect. Before developing security, we needed to recover first (conflict trauma). Natural resistance to external impositions

Rule of Law and Civilian Oversight

- ◆ Lack of attention to the rule of law, governance and oversight can also limit the practical effectiveness and durability of external support for SSR (UNSG 2008: para 41)
- ◆ UNTAET did not establish any legal framework for the security sector nor democratic control of it. Security Forces cannot operate in a vacuum anywhere in the world
- ◆ Only the Timorese Constitution mandate for external and internal security. What about border control and the coast guards?

Rule of Law and Civilian Oversight

- ◆ Absence of missions and objectives of the Security Actors
- ◆ Both Police (PNTL) and Defense Force (FDTL) were institutionally weak
- ◆ Failure of Parliamentary Democracy (Matsuno 2009)
- ◆ Political interference and Personal Loyalties
- ◆ Natural enmity was fueled by politization of the forces. FDTL with the President and PNTL with the Minister of Interior and the Prime Minister? (arms distribution episode)
- ◆ Boosted inter-forces rivalry. Competition for Power

Conclusion: SSR and Instability

- ◆ In the light of the UNSG 2008 Security Sector Reform principles, SSR is intended to create professional, effective and accountable security forces
- ◆ In the case of Timor-Leste several factors led to failure
- ◆ A Militarized Mission as a State-Builder: **a Contradiction in Terms?**
- ◆ The first was the **absence of strategic planning** and the **belated implementation of technical requirements**
- ◆ The implementation of **a plan that lacked local ownership** and proved **not to be tailored** to neither the institutional capacity nor the needs of the country

Conclusion: SSR and Instability

- ◆ Finally, a **controversial demobilization** of the Falintil (national liberation army)
- ◆ Plus the **deficient legal** security framework and the nonexistent **democratic oversight** of the police and army
- ◆ SSR did not link security with development but with future **instability and violence**
- ◆ SSR policies implemented by UNTAET in Timor-Leste contributed to the course of violent events that took place between 2002 until the crisis of 2006
- ◆ The 2006 Crisis called for peacekeepers. **External Re-intervention**

SSR and The Same Old Story?

- ◆ Timor-Leste's past shows that a certain number of donor countries also provided political support, economic aid and military cooperation to Indonesia's Suharto regime even before the annexation of Timor-Leste and until the 1999 massacres
- ◆ Moreover, history also reveals that the external powers that occupied or helped foreign interventions were simultaneously engaged during the UN interregnum in developing this incipient country
- ◆ Local population might have perceived this process as another chapter in their history of foreign interventions promising development and security

SSR and The Same Old Story?

- ◆ Nowadays, Portugal, USA, Australia and China are SSR partners
- ◆ Oil and Gas in the Timor Gap. **Blessing or Curse?**
- ◆ Containing China? Australia and NZ (ISF) military bases in Timor-Leste
- ◆ Regional geopolitics. Australia as a regional power. Security Interventions in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu
- ◆ Australia and NZ's role during the 2006 crisis. Need to re-intervention
- ◆ Australia trained leaders of 'the rebels' that took arms against the Timorese state in 2006 crisis
- ◆ In the end, who is responsible for Human Rights violations perpetrated by Security Forces that went under SSR? Donors? States? Security Institutions or just their personnel?

Timor-Leste's Prime Minister



Dear Colleagues from SACCCPS - Lusaka 2012

Muchas Gracias

Thank you very much

Merci Beaucoup

Muito Obrigado

ありがとうございました (Arigatou Gozaimashita)